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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Marcie was a loving mother and a hard worker. But all of this was 
stripped away in an instant. Marcie lost both her daughter and her ability to 
work after being struck while walking home from school by a negligent 
driver. The resulting injuries have required several surgeries. With more 
operations necessary in the future, Marcie will likely require a lifetime of 
medical care. Marcie’s employer provided her health insurance coverage. 
Unfortunately, when she lost her job because of the injuries, she lost her 
insurance as well. Due to her present condition and dearth of income, she 
is unable to afford the high premiums of private insurance. 
Marcie lives in West Palm Beach, Florida. She hired a lawyer to sue the 
driver. Her complaint demands the cost of her past and future medical care. 
While insured, Marcie enjoyed the benefit of discounted medical costs 
stemming from an agreement between her HMO and her health care 
provider.1 Now, without insurance, the costs of future medical care will not 
be discounted and Marcie will face larger, retail2 costs for the same care. 
Her attorney wants to present evidence at trial of the retail cost of her past 
care to establish the “reasonable value” of care in the future.3 However, he 
is concerned that the jury may never see these retail costs because some 
judges across the state are allowing the costs to be admitted into evidence 
while others are not.4 If the jury does not see the retail costs, Marcie may 
not see them reflected in her recovery. She may, in effect, be penalized for 
past benefits she no longer enjoys. 
Marcie is a hypothetical plaintiff and her attorney is a hypothetical 
attorney. However, there are many real “Marcies” currently facing this 
problem. There are also many real attorneys who share the concerns of 
Marcie’s attorney.5 These concerns have led attorneys to establish an e-
mail list manager to share information about exactly what evidence a 
                                                                                                                     
 1. As an example, her first surgery was billed to her insurance carrier for $10,000, but the 
doctor accepted $3,000 from the carrier in full satisfaction of the debt. 
 2. For the purpose of this Note, retail is synonymous with pre-discount, billed costs of care. 
 3. See, e.g., Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 835 (Fla. 2005) (Lewis, J., concurring in 
result only); Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). 
 4. See infra Part V. 
 5. See, e.g., Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15, 2010)(on 
file with author); Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19, 2010) (on file 
with author); Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain & Williams 
(Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices of William H. 
Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with Jeffrey R. Rollins, Attorney, Steinger, 
Iscoe & Greene, P.A. (Jan. 16, 2010) (on file with author).  
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particular judge will allow.6 Prior to entering a courtroom, they will use the 
listserv to ask, “I am in front of Judge X. Does he follow Goble or 
Thyssenkrupp?”7 The question refers to the Second District Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Goble v. Frohman8 and the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky.9  
Both Goble and Thyssenkrupp addressed the value of negotiated 
discounts between health care providers and insurance providers as 
“collateral source contributions” under Florida Statutes § 768.76.10 The 
statute both defines “collateral sources” and mandates that the value of 
such contributions be reduced from a damage award11 to prevent excess 
recovery, or “double recovery,” by plaintiffs.12 Both courts held that these 
discounts were properly set off from plaintiff awards.13 Both courts agreed 
that the statute operates as both a rule of law and a rule of evidence.14  
However, the courts conflict regarding how to apply the statute as a rule 
of evidence. In Goble, the court held that the jury should see evidence of 
the undiscounted, billed costs.15 In Thyssenkrupp, the court held that the 
jury should not see evidence of the undiscounted, billed costs.16 The key 
difference in the two cases is that Goble addressed the issue in a claim 
involving HMO coverage17 and Thyssenkrupp in a claim involving 
Medicare coverage.18 This distinction renders each case correct based on 
the plain reading of Florida Statute § 768.76, as discussed below. 
However, the misapplication and extension of Thyssenkrupp outside the 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 
 9. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 
 10. FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2010); Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 549–50; Goble, 848 So. 2d at 
408–10. 
 11. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1), (2)(a) (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., Pollo Operations, Inc. v. Tripp, 906 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); 
Goble, 848 So. 2d at 408–09 (establishing that the statute was created to “‘ensure that injured 
persons recover reasonable damages,’” “‘to encourage the settlement of civil actions prior to trial’” 
and to prevent plaintiffs from a “double recovery.”(quoting Tort Reform and Insurance Act, ch. 86–
160, 1986 Fla. Laws 699)). It is important to note that the Tripp court explained Medicare’s 
exclusion under the statute because Florida’s collateral source rule is preempted by the supremacy 
of the federal Medicare statute. The court also pointed out that “any judgment the plaintiff 
receive[d] which included the amounts paid by Medicare would still be subject to a lien.” Tripp, 
906 So. 2d at 1104 n.4. 
 13. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 550; Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410. 
 14. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 550–51 (Farmer, C.J., reh’g denied); Goble, 848 So. 2d at 
410 (citing Gormley v. GTE Prods. Corp., 587 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla.1991)). 
 15. Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410 (affirming the trial court’s exclusion of evidence regarding 
collateral source benefits). 
 16. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 550. 
 17. Goble, 848 So. 2d at 407. 
 18. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 548. 
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Medicare context has resulted in a clear conflict among the courts.19 
Once an individual has Medicare, she will never lose it. Thus, an 
injured plaintiff receiving Medicare will forever enjoy the benefit of 
discounts in future costs of care.20 The same cannot be said of private 
insurance.21 An injured plaintiff like Marcie who has lost her private 
insurance will face higher costs of care in the future without the benefit of 
discounts.22 Thus, § 768.76 rightfully results in a discounted award for 
future medical damages where future aid is guaranteed, such as Medicare, 
but not where future  aid is not guaranteed, such as in private insurance. In 
cases like Marcie’s, the proper application of § 768.76 post-trial  results in 
no risk at all of a “double recovery” because Marcie will no longer receive 
an undiscounted, future damage award while only paying a discounted 
future medical rates via her insurer since, after all, she has lost her health 
insurance.23 
Moreover, precluding Marcie from presenting the undiscounted, billed 
costs of past care to the jury may create a bias against her when the jury is 
asked to determine her future costs of care in a damage award.24 Simply 
put, although able to introduce expert testimony and other relevant 
evidence to establish the reasonable value of future care,25 when Marcie’s 
attorney asks the jury to award $60,000 for her next surgery, the response 
may be, “Why $60,000 when the bill for her last surgery was only 
$6,000?”  
Florida’s longstanding law is that future damage awards are not to be 
reduced due to collateral source contributions.26 This principle has been 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at 551 n.1 (Farmer, C.J., reh’g denied) (“One could argue there is no conflict with 
Goble . . . which involved HMO benefits rather than Medicare. To the extent that HMO benefits 
and Medicare benefits are interchangeable for this subject, however, we certify conflict.”). 
 20. See Medicare.gov, Medicare Eligibility Tool (General Enrollment), 
http://www.medicare.gov/MedicareEligibility/Home.asp?dest=NAV|Home|GeneralEnrollment# 
TabTop (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).  
 21. See generally NAYLA KAZZI, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, MORE AMERICANS ARE LOSING 
HEALTH INSURANCE EVERY DAY : AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH COVERAGE LOSSES DURING THE 
RECESSION (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/05/pdf/healthinsur 
ancelosses.pdf (discussing the markedly high number of employees who lost private health 
insurance when they lost their jobs). 
 22. See generally Alan T. Sorensen, Insurer-Hospital Bargaining: Negotiated Discounts in 
Post-Deregulation Connecticut, 51 J. INDUS. ECON. 469, 469 (2003).  
 23. Pollo Operations, Inc. v. Tripp, 906 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA. 2005). 
 24. See generally Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15, 2010)
(on file with author); Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19, 2010) (on 
file with author); Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain and 
Williams (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices of 
William H. Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with Jeffrey R. Rollins, Attorney, 
Steinger, Iscoe & Greene, P.A. (Jan. 16, 2010) (on file with author). 
 25. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.401–.402 (2010) (establishing relevance of evidence). 
 26. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 706 So. 2d 389, 390–91 (Fla.4th DCA 1998) (“[I]n 
order to have collateral source benefits set off against an award, those benefits must either be 
4
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applied to cases involving private insurance,27 workers’ compensation 
insurance,28 personal injury protection (PIP) insurance,29 and even 
Medicare30 and Medicaid.31 As stated by the Fifth District Court of Appeal, 
“The statute does not purport to benefit the tortfeasor by deducting 
collateral sources to which the insured may be entitled in the future.”32 
Plaintiff attorneys facing this issue believe that courts improperly applying 
Thyssenkrupp in non-Medicare cases are endorsing de facto reductions in 
future damages by preventing the jury from properly evaluating the 
reasonable value of future care.33 
This issue remains unsettled by the Florida Supreme Court.34 Wi hout 
such guidance from the supreme court, lower courts are misapplying the 
holdings of Thyssenkrupp to non-Medicare cases.35 A  the Thyssenkrupp 
court properly found, Medicare benefits are specifically excluded as 
collateral sources.36 In light of that, it is improper to apply the 
Thyssenkrupp standard to those collateral sources that are statutorily 
defined by and fall within the post-trial restrictions of § 768.76, such as 
non-Medicare sources of assistance. Nonetheless, attorneys are seizing on 
the confusion and absorbing the courts’ time with motions arguing each 
side.37 The result is that where Goble is not controlling,38 lower courts are 
choosing, ad hoc, whether to follow Goble and admit the undiscounted, 
billed amount or to follow Thyssenkrupp and admit only the discounted 
amount into evidence.39 Across the state, some courts are applying the 
                                                                                                                     
already paid . . . or presently earned and currently due and owing . . . .” (citing White v. Westlund, 
624 So. 2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993))); Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc., 
568 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla.5th DCA 1990). 
 27. Rudnick, 706 So. 2d at 390–91. 
 28. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDermott, 929 So. 2d 1114, 1117–18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). 
 29. Pizzarelli v. Rollins, 704 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). 
 30. Grell v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 3:05-cv-1237-J-32HTS, 2007 WL 1362728, at *3 (M.D. 
Fla. May 7, 2007) (citing Rudnick, 761 So. 2d at 390). 
 31. Bravo v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1199 n.13 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (noting that no 
set off for future Medicaid payments is permitted under Florida law). 
 32. Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc., 568 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1990). 
 33. Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
 34. Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 2005) (limiting the holding to whether 
discounts qualify as “collateral sources” and not ruling on the statute as a rule of evidence). 
 35. See infra Part V. 
 36. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(b) (2010). 
 37. See infra Part VI.B. 
 38. That area includes anywhere outside of the Second Judicial District of Florida.  
 39. Compare Order Granting Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Limit Medical Expenses 
Introduced Into Evidence at 1, Stone v. Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 01-05-CA-4098 K (Fla. 8th 
Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 2009), and Omnibus Order on Motions in Limine at 5, Slavin v. Mount Sinai Med. 
Ctr., No. 06-954 CA 11 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 2009) (excluding billed costs), and Order on 
Defendant’s Motions in Limine at 1, Young v. Gray, No. 03-CA 8295 A (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 
5
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latter, without distinguishing Medicare from private insurance.40  
To resolve the confusion, clarification of Florida Statutes § 768.76 as a 
rule of evidence is necessary. Part II of this Note will provide a history of 
the collateral source doctrine, including some of the ways it has been 
abrogated by courts and state legislatures. Part III will discuss Florida’s 
abrogation of the common law rule with the enactment of § 768.76. This 
will include a plain reading of the language most applicable to this topic. 
Part IV will analyze the decisions in Goble I, Thyssenkrupp, and Goble II 
to set the background for why there are different evidentiary standards 
being applied in the lower courts. Part V will provide accounts from 
practitioners who are seeing this issue play out in the courts. These 
accounts offer unique insight into the issue. This Part will also analyze the 
orders and thoughts of judges who have given salient justifications for 
following Goble and nonetheless apply Thyssenkrupp. Part VI will contrast 
whether clarification would be better provided by the Florida Legislature 
amending the statute or the Florida Supreme Court clarifying the 
application of the present statutory language. Part VII will discuss Florida’s 
status as a “reasonable value” jurisdiction, its history of refusing to reduce 
awards of future damages, and other evidentiary issues pertinent to the 
present conflict. Finally, Part VIII analyzes and distinguishes two recent 
decisions from the supreme courts of Ohio and Kansas which pose a 
different solution than that found in either Goble or Thyssenkrupp.  
This Note will argue that where no other statute conflicts,41 he plain 
language of Florida Statutes § 786.76 clearly vests exclusive power in “the 
court”42 to set off the contributions from collateral sources, post-award.43 
Therefore, the correct evidentiary standard in cases involving statutorily 
defined “collateral sources” is that endorsed by the Goble court: excluding 
such evidence until after a jury determination of damages.44 Without 
allowing the billed costs into evidence, there will be no need for “the 
court” to reduce awards and the statutory text will be meaningless, lacking 
form and substance. Marcie’s jury should see the retail, undiscounted, 
billed costs of her past care as evidence of the “reasonable value” of her 
future care.  
 
                                                                                                                     
2005) (excluding billed costs), with Order on Defendants’ First Motion in Limine, Stratton v. 
Comcast of Greater Fla./Ga., Inc., No. 16-2007-CA-007154 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 2009) 
(allowing billed costs), and Order on Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Regarding Admission of Medical 
Bills Into Evidence, Muentes v. Auerbach, No. 2003-CA-004105-AJ (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 
2005) (allowing billed costs), and Order on KLI’s Motion in Limine Relating to Medical Bills, 
Wood v. KLI, Inc., No. 03-923 CA (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. May 1, 2005) (allowing billed costs). 
 40. See supra note 39. 
 41. See infra Part III.A. 
 42. See infra Part III.C. 
 43. See infra Part III.B. 
 44. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 
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II.   THE COMMON LAW COLLATERAL SOURCE DOCTRINE: FROM 
INCEPTION TO ABROGATION 
Some of the most renowned legal economists regard the collateral 
source doctrine as an efficient element of the common law.45 Although not 
the first case on record addressing the concept, many consider Propeller 
Monticello v. Mollison46 to be the “seminal” case on the topic.47 In 
Mollison, the U.S. Supreme Court held that no defense may be founded on 
the fact that insurers had already paid for damages incurred by the 
plaintiff.48 The Mollison Court stated that this was a “doctrine well 
established at common law.”49 This doctrine placed a bar on any evidence 
of contributions or reimbursements to the plaintiff being introduced to 
reduce the liability of a tortfeasor.50 For more than a century, this rule was 
consistently applied in the lower courts across the nation.51 Justifications 
for maintaining the rule included: (1) not providing a tortfeasor with the 
benefit of the plaintiff’s bargain with an insurer,52 (2) not punishing a 
responsible plaintiff for carrying insurance,53 (3) providing a deterrence 
mechanism,54 and (4) promoting a public policy against a windfall to a 
tortfeasor.55  
As a creature of common law,56 the doctrine was subject to 
modification at the discretion of state legislatures. It remained almost 
universally unaltered until the 1980s, when many states began abrogating 
the doctrine through legislation aimed at combating a trend of rising 
damage awards, specifically in medical malpractice claims.57 These awards 
                                                                                                                     
 45. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 199–200 (7th ed. 2007) 
(stating that the possibility of double recovery is secondary to the need for the full cost of negligent 
behavior be imposed on tortfeasors to encourage the proper level of care to be taken). 
 46. 58 U.S. 152 (1854). 
 47. Guillermo Gabriel Zorogastua, Comment, Improperly Divorced from Its Roots: The 
Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare and Medicaid Write-
offs, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 475–76 (2007) (citing Douglas H. Schwartz, Comment, The Tortured 
Path of Ohio’s Collateral Source Rule, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 643, 643 (1997)). 
 48. Mollison, 58 U.S. at 155. 
 49. Id.  
 50. See, e.g., Urbanak v. Hinde, 497 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). 
 51. Deborah Van Meter, Comment, Louisiana’s Collateral Source Rule: Time for a Change?, 
32 LOY. L. REV. 978, 980–82 (1987). 
 52. Amwest Sav. Ass’n v. Statewide Capital, Inc., 144 F.3d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 53. Green v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing 
Quinones v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 1986)).  
 54. Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 700 (La. 2004). 
 55. Green, 59 F.3d at 1032 (citing FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1083 (10th 
Cir. 1994)). 
 56. See generally Zorogastua, supra note 47 (discussing the common law roots of the 
collateral source rule). 
 57. See In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1384 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (commenting on the statutory reform which swept the country in the 1980s); see also Jennifer 
7
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were viewed as creating a “crisis” in the health care and health insurance 
industries.58 Litigants have raised equal protection challenges to legislation 
mandating different rules based on different collateral sources in different 
types of cases.59 These challenges have been generally unsuccessful with 
courts largely justifying their rulings based on deference to the 
legislature.60 
Another method of abrogation allows for evidence of collateral sources 
based on the subrogation rights, or right to reimbursement, of the source.61 
By allowing evidence of these collateral source contributions into evidence 
and not reducing their value from a plaintiff’s award, the plaintiff will be 
able to recover an amount sufficient to satisfy any existing liens.62 At the 
same time, where the plaintiff is under no obligation to remit any portion 
of her recovery, a large award may create a windfall for the plaintiff.63  
Based on the same “windfall” logic, other methods of abrogation have 
included establishing “benefit of the bargain” or “actual amount paid” 
standards.64 Under the “benefit of the bargain” approach, courts “allow 
plaintiffs who have private insurance to recover the full amount of their 
medical expenses because they have bargained for the benefits they 
received.”65 Under the less plaintiff-friendly “actual amount paid” 
approach, responsible plaintiffs who carry insurance may not recover any 
                                                                                                                     
Howard, Alabama’s New Collateral Source Rule: Observations from the Plaintiff’s Perspective, 32 
CUMB. L. REV. 573, 573, 575 (2002) (discussing Alabama as an example); Chandler Gregg, 
Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Problem with No Answer, 70 MO. L. REV. 307, 307–
12 (2005); Zorogastua, supra note 47, at 478 (discussing Kansas as an example).   
 58. See L. Timothy Perrin, Comment, The Collateral Source Rule in Texas: Its Impending 
Demise and a Proposed Modification, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 961, 961 (1987); Julie A. Schafer, 
Note, The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits Under Ohio Revised Code Section 
2317.45, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 587, 587 (1992). 
 59. See, e.g., Marsh v. Green. 782 So. 2d 223, 231–33 (Ala. 2000) (holding the challenged 
Alabama abrogation statute constitutional); Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1095 
(Fla.1987) (holding some portions of Florida’s Tort Reform and Insurance Act constitutional and 
others unconstitutional). 
 60. See, e.g., Green, 782 So. 2d at 231. 
 61. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.070 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225a (2010); FLA. 
STAT. § 768.76 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1205 (2009); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &  JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06 (West 
2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6303 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 548.251 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 27-1-308 (2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (2009); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-12 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-405 (2010). 
 62. See supra note 61. 
 63. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) 
(“Allowing the admission of evidence of the excess discharged . . . has the effect of ‘provid[ing] an 
undeserved and unnecessary windfall to the plaintiff.’” (quoting Fla. Physician’s Ins. Reciprocal v. 
Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla.1984))). 
 64. See Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1025–29 (Ill. 2008) (providing in-depth discussion 
of the different standards of recovery across many jurisdictions). 
 65. Id. at 1026. 
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amounts “written off” by the health care provider from negotiated or 
contractual discounts.66 Both of these approaches have been criticized for 
“using the plaintiff’s relationship with a third party to measure the 
tortfeasor’s liability.”67  
Florida, like the majority of states,68 follows a “reasonable value” 
approach under which the plaintiff may recover the reasonable value of 
medical services.69 Many jurisdictions apply this standard without regard to 
whether the contributions were made by private insurance or a 
government-sponsored program, e.g., Medicare.70 Florida, however, has 
chosen to limit the reasonable value to the actual amount paid when a 
government-sponsored program such as Medicare is at issue.71  
The Florida Legislature codified the state’s abrogation of the common 
law doctrine72 in Florida Statutes § 768.76.73 The statute established the 
standard by which collateral source contributions are to be set off from 
damage awards.74 The question which remains unclear is how the statute 
should operate as a rule of evidence—i.e., how, when, and by whom an 
award will be reduced.  
III.   FLORIDA STATUTES § 768.76: A PLAIN READING 
The Florida Legislature enacted Florida Statutes § 768.76 in 1986 “‘to 
cure the current crisis’” in liability insurance.75 The statute reads as 
follows: 
(1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability 
is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact andin which 
damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 1025. 
 67. Id. at 1027. 
 68. Id. at 1028. 
 69. Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
 70. See, e.g., Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1029–31 (noting that Illinois follows the reasonable-value 
approach, under which all plaintiffs are entitled to recover the full reasonable value of their medical 
expenses, regardless of whether they have private insurance or are covered by a government 
program).  
 71. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(b) (2010) (defining Medicare and other public programs as 
outside the collateral source statute); see also Coop. Leasing, Inc., 872 So. 2d at 960 (holding 
Medicare discounted benefits are not recoverable in a damage award); Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. 
v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding Medicare discounts not recoverable in 
damages). 
 72. Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 836 (Fla. 2005) (Lewis, J., concurring in result only) 
(“Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes abrogated the common law collateral source rule and 
replaced it with a statutory provision . . . .”).  
 73. FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2010). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 408–09 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (quoting Tort Reform 
and Insurance Act, ch. 86–160, 1986 Fla. Laws 699)).  
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sustained, the court shall reduce the amount of such award by 
the total of all amounts which ave been paid for the benefit 
of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to the 
claimant, from all collateral sources. . . .76 
It is axiomatic that “statutory language must be accorded its plain 
meaning.”77 Therefore, any answer to the present question begins with a 
plain reading and clear understanding of the following four phrases in the 
first section of the statute: (1) “to which this part applies,” (2) “in which 
damages are awarded,” (3) “the court shall,” and (4) “have been paid.”78  
A.  “To Which This Part Applies” 
The beginning of the statute establishes both the scope of the statute 
and its limitations. The statement “to which this part applies” is a 
reference to Part II of Chapter 768, which encompasses §§ 768.71–
.81.79 The first section of Part II establishes that the Part is applicable 
“‘[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided . . . to any action for 
                                                                                                                     
 76. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1) (2010) (emphasis added). The statute also reads: 
(2) For purposes of this section: 
(a) “Collateral sources” means any payments made to the claimant, or made 
on the claimant’s behalf, by or pursuant to:  
. . . . 
2. Any health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident 
insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any 
other similar insurance benefits, . . . . 
3. Any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or 
corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, 
or other health care services. 
. . . . 
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, benefits received 
under Medicare, . . . the Medicaid program . . . or from any medical services 
program administered by the Department of Health shall not be considered a 
collateral source.  
 
Id. § 768.76(2) (emphasis added). 
 77. Pizzarelli v. Rollins, 704 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“The law clearly holds 
that unambiguous statutory language must be accorded its plain meaning.” (citing Carson v. Miller, 
370 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979))). 
 78. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1) (2010). 
 79. Id.; see also Caruso v. Baumle, 880 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 2004) (interpreting this portion 
of the statute). 
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damages, whether in tort or in contract.’”80 However, the statute goes on to 
state that “‘[i]f a provision of this part is in conflict with any other 
provision of the Florida Statutes, such other provision shall apply.’”81 
Therefore, the application of § 768.76 as either a rule of law or a rule of 
evidence will only arise in the event that no other statute establishes a 
different rule. 
The Florida Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in Caruso v. 
Baumle.82 The court interpreted this portion of the statute only to 
differentiate it from another statute, § 627.736.83 The latter is part of the 
Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law,84 which “governs suits arising out of 
motor vehicle accidents.”85 The court explained that § 627.736(3) was an 
example of a statute in conflict with § 768.76 in regards to the 
admissibility of collateral source contributions.86 It stated that § 627.736(3) 
placed the responsibility for set off in the hands of the jury and not in the 
court as in § 768.76.87 However, as Caruso dealt solely with § 627.736, the 
court’s analysis of § 768.76 is purely dicta.  
In the Caruso court’s analysis, Marcie’s case would be governed by 
§ 768.76 and the judge, not the jury, would be exclusively responsible for 
any reduction of a jury award. 
B.  “In Which Damages Are Awarded” 
A plain reading of this statutory phrase suggests that any set off is not to 
be applied until after damages have been awarded. The preceding portion 
of the statute, “in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of 
fact,”88 supports such a reading. By affirming the trial court’s post-verdict 
set off of the discounts, the Second District Court of Appeal in Goble 
seemed to agree with this interpretation.89 In Thyssenkrupp, the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal vitiated the need for a post-trial set off by holding 
that Medicare benefits were not collateral sources under the statute.90 
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff could not present to the trier of 
fact the undiscounted, billed medical costs as damages incurred by the 
plaintiff, effectively and preemptively setting off—or discounting—a 
jury’s damage award.  
                                                                                                                     
 80. Caruso, 880 So. 2d at 544 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.71(1) (2001)) (alterations in 
original). 
 81. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.71(3) (2001)) (alterations in original). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 543–46. 
 84. FLA. STAT §§ 627.730–.7405 (2010). 
 85. Caruso, 880 So. 2d at 544. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1) (2010). 
 89.  Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 
 90. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 
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When constrained to the facts of each case, both holdings appear 
correct under the statute. However, courts outside of the Second District 
Court of Appeal are incorrectly applying Thyssenkrupp to cases involving 
statutory collateral source contributions, e.g., non-Medicare sources.91 
Based on the holding of Thyssenkrupp, they argue that the undiscounted 
billed costs represent no damage to the plaintiff and should not be 
presented to the jury.92 Such an interpretation conflicts with the plain 
language of the statute, which mandates that statutory collateral source 
contributions are to be set off only after “liability is admitted or is 
determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded.”93 
C.  “The Court Shall” 
Florida Statutes § 768.76 mandates that “the court shall” be charged 
with applying any set offs from collateral source contributions.94 This 
obligation is the exclusive province of the court and not the fact-finder.95 
The Florida Supreme Court endorsed this interpretation in Caruso. It 
stated, “Thus, under section 768.76(1), the court reduces the jury award by 
the amount of collateral source benefits.”96 In comparing § 768.76 with 
§ 627.736, it also stated, “[I]n contrast to the procedure under section 
768.76(1), in which the court offsets the collateral source amount, under 
section 627.736(3), the trier of fact—whether judge or jury—is to offset 
the amount.”97 
In effect, courts expanding the holding of Thyssenkrupp to non-
Medicare discounts are selectively applying § 768.76. However, statutes 
are not meant to be read or applied only in part.98 These pre-award 
evidentiary rulings violate both the letter and spirit of the statute. 
D.  “Have Been Paid” 
This portion of the statute has been the subject of review in many 
cases.99 It was also at the heart of the certified question from the Second 
                                                                                                                     
 91. See supra note 39. 
 92. See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing at 2–6, Favazzi v. Am. Retirement Corp. (No. 50-
2003CA-12992) (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 28, 2005) (hearing on defense motion in limine to exclude 
billed amounts). 
 93. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1) (2010). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Caruso v. Baumle, 880 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 2004). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. (first emphasis added). 
 98. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 2000) 
(“[S]tatute should be construed in its entirety and as a harmonious whole.” (citing Sun Ins. Off., 
Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961))); Fleischman v. Dep’t of Prof’l Reg., 441 So. 2d 1121, 
1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“Every statute must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every 
portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 959–60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); 
Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 706 So. 
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District Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court in Goble.100 The 
court’s answer made clear that these types of negotiated discounts do 
qualify as benefits paid on behalf of the plaintiff and therefore are properly 
set off under § 768.76, post-trial and by the judge.101 Most importantly, the 
statute’s term “have been paid” is in the past tense. This is essential to 
understanding and properly applying the statute. Set offs are only to be 
applied for benefits already received, or “earned,”102 and not based on 
potential future benefits.103 Therefore, because possible future discounts 
have not yet been paid or earned (and may never be), courts must allow 
evidence of undiscounted, billed costs of past care to establish the 
reasonable costs of future care. To do otherwise would nullify this statutory 
language.  
Based on a plain reading of Florida Statutes § 768.76, (1) where no 
other statute conflicts, (2) post-verdict, (3) the judge shall (4) reduce the 
jury award by the amount of collateral source contribution already received 
by the plaintiff. Therefore, to effectuate the statute’s language and purpose, 
it should preclude the finder of fact from considering the value of these 
collateral source contributions in determining the reasonable value of care 
and a tortfeasor’s liability. 
IV.   THE CURRENT CONFLICT—GOBLE I, THYSSENKRUPP, AND 
GOBLE II  
A.  The Second District Court of Appeal’s Decision in 
Goble—“Goble I” 
In 2003, the Second District Court of Appeal heard Goble v. 
Frohman.104 Albert Goble was riding his motorcycle105 when he was hit by 
Mark Frohman’s vehicle.106 Goble had insurance through an HMO,107 and 
the undiscounted, billed cost of his medical care amounted to 
                                                                                                                     
2d 389, 390–91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 
 100. Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2005) (answering certified question, “Under 
section 768.76 . . . is it appropriate to setoff against the damages portion of an award the amounts of 
reasonable and necessary medical bills that were written off by medical providers pursuant to their 
contracts with a health maintenance organization?”). 
 101. Id. at 833. 
 102. Fla. Physician’s Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla.1984) (“We believe 
that the common-law collateral source rule should be limited to those benefits earned in some way 
by the plaintiff.”).  
 103. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text. 
 104. 848 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 
 105. Because the Florida No Fault Vehicle Act applies only to vehicles with four or more 
wheels, Albert Goble did not carry PIP insurance and § 627.736 (mandating a different collateral 
source rule) was not implicated. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 106. Goble, 848 So. 2d at 407. 
 107. Id. 
13
Steinberg: Discounted Medical Bills and Conflicting Applications of Florida
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
1444 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
$574,554.31.108 These undiscounted, billed costs were presented as 
evidence to the jury who awarded Goble the full amount in damages.109 
Due to a contractual discount between his HMO and his health care 
provider, the provider accepted only $145,970.76 from the HMO in full 
satisfaction of the debt.110 After the jury reached an award of the full billed 
costs, the trial judge granted a motion from Frohman to “set off” the 
contractual discount amount under § 768.76.111 
On appeal, Goble argued that these discounts were not “collateral 
sources” under § 768.76 and were improperly set off.112 On cross-appeal, 
Frohman challenged that he should have been able to present evidence of 
the discounts to the jury.113 The Second District Court of Appeal ruled 
against Goble and held that these types of discounts qualified as collateral 
sources under the statute and were properly set off by the judge, post-
trial.114 However, more importantly, the court ruled against Frohman and 
held that evidence of collateral source benefits (specifically, discounts) was 
inadmissible and that the trial judge was correct in admitting the 
undiscounted, billed costs of care into evidence.115  
In reaching this decision, the court cited Gormley v. GTE Products 
Corp.116 for the proposition that the collateral source doctrine is both a rule 
of damages and a rule of evidence.117 As a rule of evidence, it “prohibits 
the admission of evidence regarding collateral sources in the liability trial 
because it ‘misleads the jury on the issue of liability.’”118 The court 
acknowledged Frohman’s right to challenge the reasonableness of the costs 
of care.119 In support of its holding against the use of collateral source 
evidence in such a challenge, the court reasoned that “there generally will 
be other evidence having more probative value and involving less
likelihood of prejudice than the victim’s receipt of insurance type 
benefits.”120 To further support the lack of value inherent in this evidence 
of discounts, the court cited its holding in Hillsborough County Hospital 
Authority v. Fernandez.121 In Fernandez, the court held that “evidence of 
contractual discounts received by managed care providers is 
                                                                                                                     
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 407–08. 
 111. Id. at 408. 
 112. Id. at 407. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 410. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Gormley v. GTE Prods. Corp., 587 So. 2d 455 (Fla.1991). 
 117. Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410 (quoting Gormley, 587 So. 2d at 457). 
 118. Id. (quoting Gormley, 587 So. 2d at 458). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (quoting Gormley, 587 So. 2d at 458) (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. (citing Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Fernandez, 664 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1995)). 
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insufficient . . . to prove that nondiscounted medical bills were 
unreasonable.”122  
The Goble court determined that this presented a case of “great public 
importance.”123 It certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court relating 
only to the holding that these discounts qualified as statutory collateral 
source contributions.124 It did not certify a question regarding the court’s 
evidentiary holding—that the discounted billed medical costs were 
inadmissible evidence for the trier of fact in determining damages. 
Therefore, the evidentiary question remains unanswered. 
B.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal’s Holding and 
Certification of Conflict in Thyssenkrupp 
Later in 2003, the Fourth District Court of Appeal heard Thyssenkrupp 
Elevator Corp. v. Lasky.125 Beatrice Lasky was injured while a passenger 
on a Thyssenkrupp elevator126 and had health insurance provided by 
Medicare.127 Thyssenkrupp challenged the trial court’s refusal to set off the 
amount of the discounts between Medicare and the plaintiff’s health care 
provider.128 On appeal, Thyssenkrupp asserted that the undiscounted, billed 
costs were neither admissible as evidence of damages nor exempt from a 
judicial set off, post trial.129 It reasoned that awarding the undiscounted, 
billed costs above the negotiated prices actually paid on Lasky’s behalf 
amounted to “unwarranted surplus damage” which would provide a 
windfall.130 The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed and held that the 
Medicare discounts were inadmissible as damages—thus barring the 
plaintiff from proffering her undiscounted medical bills as evidence of past 
or future damages.131 
The court cited Florida Physician’s Insurance Reciprocal v. Stanley132 
as “instructive” of the principal that these discounted amounts were 
inadmissible as damages suffered by the plaintiff and extensively quoted 
that case.133 In Stanley, the Florida Supreme Court faced the question of 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. (citing Fernandez, 664 So. 2d at 1072). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (“Under section 768.76 . . . is it appropriate to setoff against the damages portion of an 
award the amounts of reasonable and necessary medical bills that were written off by medical 
providers pursuant to their contracts with a health maintenance organization?”). 
 125. 868 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 
 126. Id. at 548. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 548–49. 
 129. Id. at 549. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 550. 
 132. Id. at 549 (citing to Fla. Physcian’s Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514 
(Fla.1984)). 
 133. Id. 
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whether evidence of public services for future medical care was outside of 
the collateral source rule and, therefore, admissible.134 The Stanley court 
acknowledged that the collateral source rule was a “well settled rule of 
damages.”135 However, the Stanley Court cited extensively to a holding by 
the Illinois Supreme Court in Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.136 to 
support Stanley’s holding that the rule should not apply and the evidence of 
discounted medical bills was admissible at trial.137 The Fourth District 
Court of Appeal followed the Stanley line of reasoning and reversed the 
damage award based on its belief that “[a]llowing the admission of 
evidence of the excess discharged by Medicare payment has the effect of 
‘provid[ing] an undeserved and unnecessary windfall to the plaintiff.’”138  
Lasky moved for a re-hearing and argued that the court’s holding would 
allow for the set off of Medicare discounts as a collateral source, which 
they are explicitly not under statute.139 In denying the motion, the court 
acknowledged the confusion and clarified any “misapprehension” about the 
precise holding.140 It stated that the holding was evidentiary and that the 
undiscounted, billed amount was inadmissible as “not tend[ing] to prove 
that the claimant has suffered any loss by reason of the charge.”141 The 
court certified conflict with Goble but noted that, “One could argue there is 
no conflict with Goble v. Frohman . . . which involved HMO benefits 
rather than Medicare. To the extent that HMO benefits and Medicare 
benefits are interchangeable for this subject, however, we certify 
conflict.”142  
With due respect to the court, this Note argues that to no extent are 
HMO benefits and Medicare benefits interchangeable for this subject. 
HMO benefits are statutorily defined collateral sources143 and Medicare 
benefits are specifically excluded as such.144 The court could have avoided 
conflict by expressly limiting its holdings to non-statutory collateral source 
contributions. By not doing so, the court’s certification statement 
unnecessarily created a potential conflict.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 134.  Stanley, 452 So. 2d at 515. All of the referenced material noted herein from Stanley was 
quoted in the Thyssenkrupp case in support of the latter’s holding.  
 135. Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 136. Id. at 515–16 (citing Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1979)).  
 137. Id.at 516. (“‘In a situation in which the injured party incurs no expense, obligation, or 
liability, we see no justification for applying the [collateral source] rule.’” (quoting Peterson, 392 
N.E.2d at 5)).  
 138. Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 550 (quoting Stanley, 452 So. 2d at 515). 
 139. Id. (Farmer, C.J., reh’g denied). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 551. 
 142. Id. at 551 n.1. 
 143. See FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(a)(2) (2010). 
 144. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(b) (2010). 
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It is of note that the reliance on Stanley is questionable since it was 
decided prior to the enactment of § 768.76.145 Stanley is also 
distinguishable because it involved the defendant’s ability to challenge the 
reasonableness of damages and not the plaintiff’s right or ability to 
establish reasonable damages.146 This is significant because in a situation 
such as Stanley, a defendant will be challenging evidence a plaintiff has put 
forth; however, in a situation such as Thyssenkrupp, a plaintiff will be 
foreclosed from putting forth the same evidence to begin with. 
Additionally, in 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled Peterson, a 
case the Stanley court heavily relied upon it in holding.147 It held that 
Peterson was “incompatible with the reasonable-value approach adopted 
by this court.”148 In fact, it cited both Goble I and Gormley in support of its 
holding that in reasonable value jurisdictions, “the evidentiary component 
[of the collateral source rule] prevents ‘defendants from introducing 
evidence that a plaintiff’s losses have been compensated for, even in part, 
by insurance.’”149 Despite these questions regarding the authority relied on 
by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Thyssenkrupp, the holding 
remains in place.150 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Answer to the Second District Court of 
Appeal—Goble II 
In 2005, The Florida Supreme Court answered the question certified by 
the Second District Court of Appeal in Goble I.151 The court held that the 
discounts fit within the statutory definition of collateral sources.152 As 
such, the amount of the discounts was properly set off against the jury’s 
award of compensatory damages post trial.153 The court reasoned that 
acceptance of the discounted amounts by the provider “fully discharged” 
Goble’s obligations and were, therefore, “a benefit” falling within the 
intent of § 768.76.154  
The certified question dealt only with the issue of whether these 
discounts qualified as collateral sources to be set off by the court. It did not 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Stanley was decided in 1984 while § 768.76 was not enacted until 1986. 
 146. See Fla. Physician’s Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1984). 
 147. Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1031 (Ill. 2008). 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 1032–33 (quoting Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ill. 2005)). 
 150. This Note does not question the validity of either Goble I or Thyssenkrupp in holding that 
these negotiated discounts are properly off-set by the court, post award. The issue is focused on the 
contrasting applications of § 768.76 as an evidentiary rule and whether the finders of fact should be 
presented with the undiscounted—or  “total cost”—of care (Goble I) or the discounted, “actual 
cost” of care (Thyssenkrupp).  
 151. Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2005). 
 152. Id. at 833. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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inquire into the evidentiary standard applied by the trial court, which 
excluded the evidence of the discounted medical bills. The court’s answer 
that “[t]he trial court, therefore, properly applied section 768.76 to reduce 
Goble’s damages by the amount of the discounts,”155 could be read as an 
approval of the evidentiary standard employed by the same trial court. 
However, as this was not the question addressed, any such reading, while 
logical, would be pure conjecture. 
As they stand, the Goble I and Thyseenkrupp decisions are being read 
by some courts to be in conflict regarding the application of § 768.76 as a 
rule of evidence. Thus, they require clarification. 
V.  THE CURRENT CONFUSION: EXPANDING APPLICATION OF 
THYSSENKRUPP 
This Note’s author distributed a survey to plaintiff and defense 
attorneys across the state. The survey asked for first-hand observations of 
how the conflict is playing out in the lower courts. Additionally, hearing 
transcripts and judicial orders were analyzed to gain insight into the 
thoughts of judges who hear these cases and motions. The results of the 
analysis and the responses from those familiar with this issue were eye-
opening.  
Respondents confirmed that some circuit courts are expanding the 
evidentiary holdings of Thyssenkrupp to non-Medicare cases and 
precluding evidence of the undiscounted, billed costs of care.156 This 
results in the introduction of evidence of discounted medical bills to the 
trier of fact—in contravention of §768.76. In the opinion of many plaintiff 
attorneys who are seeing the current confusion play out across the state, the 
expansive application is creating a bias against plaintiffs, resulting in an 
inability to sufficiently prove future damages.157 Defense attorneys 
endorsing the application of Thyssenkrupp to non-Medicare cases assert 
that any bias created is vitiated by other evidence (e.g., expert testimony) 
that the plaintiff may use to establish the reasonable costs of future care.158 
Without clear guidance from the appellate courts, circuit judges are subject 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Id. 
 156. See, e.g., Interview with Rich Barry, Attorney, Gray Robinson (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file 
with author); Interview with Sean C. Domnick, Partner, Domnick & Shevin (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file 
with author); Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file 
with author); Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19, 2010) (on file with 
author); Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain and Williams (Jan. 
15, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices of William H. 
Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with Jeffrey R. Rollins, Attorney, Steinger, 
Iscoe & Greene, P.A. (Jan. 16, 2010) (on file with author). 
 157. See supra note 5. 
 158. See, e.g., Interview with Rich Barry, Attorney, Gray Robinson (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file 
with author). 
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to attorneys arguing on both sides.159  
A.  In the Trenches: The Practitioners’ View 
Plaintiff attorneys had strong opinions on this issue and, based on the 
proportion of responses to the survey, were eager to share them.160 
Regarding the perception that courts expanding Thyssenkrupp create a bias 
against plaintiffs, one respondent stated that, “[D]isparity in apparent costs 
creates confusion and the illusion that the plaintiff is overreaching with 
regard to future care.”161 Another stated that, “[T]he jury will be left 
wondering why the past medical bills are so low and the future medical 
bills are so high.”162 Another stated that, “They [jurors] think the plaintiff 
is being greedy but in reality the plaintiff probably can’t get insurance.”163 
Another stated that, “[T]he jury is prevented from on its own deciding 
what amount of medical bills is reasonable and necessary and sees only a 
deflated amount of medical expenses incurred.”164  
Regarding the inconsistency among the courts, one respondent stated 
that, “There is inconsistency from judge-to-judge in every county wherein I 
practice, from Broward County up to Indian River County, FL.”165 Another 
respondent put it more bluntly and stated that, “[It’s] a crap shoot which 
judge you are assigned to and it [affects] the likely award not only of past 
medicals but of other damages as well.”166 
These opinions reflect the concern of Marcie’s attorney and each of the 
plaintiff attorneys who responded to the survey. The consensus is that 
where benefits may or may not be available to a plaintiff in the future, 
courts applying Thyssenkrupp in cases involving statutorily-defined 
collateral sources are penalizing plaintiffs and enabling de facto reductions 
in future damage awards by allowing prior, discounted medical bills to 
artificially deflate the value of potential undiscounted medical bills in the 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing, supra note 92. 
 160. Responses numbered thirteen from plaintiff attorneys and three from defense attorneys. 
Initial survey distribution was to an equal number of plaintiff and defense attorneys. However, 
because the survey was available on an open Internet website and the initial survey recipients were 
encouraged to share the survey with others, the precise number of total, or proportional, recipients 
is not available. 
 161. Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
 162. Interview with Sean C. Domnick, Partner, Domnick & Shevin (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file 
with author). 
 163. Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain & Williams (Jan. 
15, 2010) (on file with author). 
 164. Interview with Jeffrey R. Rollins, Attorney, Steinger, Iscoe & Greene, P.A. (Jan. 16, 
2010) (on file with author). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices of William H. Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on 
file with author). 
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future.167 Of those who responded, few disagreed with the holding of 
Thyssenkrupp when restricted to cases involving discounts to Medicare.168 
They do, however, take issue with trial courts who are refusing to admit the 
billed costs of care in non-Medicare cases based on the holdings in 
Thyssenkrupp.  
Much like one would expect in a judicial hearing on this issue, defense 
attorneys who responded to the survey put forth many reasonable counter 
arguments. Most commonly, they asserted that any possible bias is 
nullified by plaintiffs’ attorneys using other mechanisms to establish the 
reasonable costs of care.169 As one respondent stated, “[Bias] is a 
possibility, but I doubt it. Plaintiff’s [sic] typically have an expert of some 
sort (or several experts) explain in minute detail all of the future medical 
expenses the injured party faces.”170 On this point, plaintiff attorneys who 
responded generally stated that such experts have the possibility of 
confusing the lay jury.171 One defense attorney had more faith in the jury 
and stated, “I don’t think that just because a plaintiff has only ‘incurred’ 
$145,000 in bills for their [sic] profound injuries [it] will make the jury any 
less inclined to believe the future damages experts.”172 This is indicative of 
the pattern of trust that was apparent in the survey responses, with plaintiff 
attorneys less confident a jury could find their way through the weeds. 
The survey confirmed that this is an issue being faced by practitioners 
throughout the state. With no uniform standard, the result is that court time 
is being spent hearing motions, countermotions, answers, and answers to 
answers that would be unnecessary if there were a clear rule. Rules of 
evidence exist, in part, to prevent exactly this result.173 Brilliant attorneys 
on both sides are admirably pursuing their client’s interests by persuading 
judges. Unfortunately, the result is that judges are not only in conflict with 
each other but often in conflict with themselves. 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See supra notes 5, 157 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2010) (on file 
with author). This Note, too, does not impugn courts restricting Thyssenkrupp to Medicare cases.  
 169. See, e.g., Interview with Rich Barry, Attorney, Gray Robinson (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file 
with author). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See generally Interview with Sean C. Domnick, Partner, Domnick & Shevin (Jan. 15, 
2010) (on file with author); Interview with Mariano Garcia, Partner, Gonzalez & Garcia (Jan. 15, 
2010) (on file with author); Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19, 
2010) (on file with author); Interview with Nancy La Vista, Attorney, Lytal, Reiter Clark Fountain 
and Williams (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author); Interview with William H. Pincus, Law Offices 
of William H. Pincus (Jan. 18, 2010) (on file with author). 
 172. Interview with Rich Barry, Attorney, Gray Robinson (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file with author).  
 173. 1CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &  LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:15 (3d ed. 
2007) (“The court’s time is a public commodity that should not be squandered. Witnesses and jurors 
have private lives and ought not be asked to give more of their time than is necessary to resolve 
disputes.”). 
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B.  In the Trenches: A View from the Bench 
The Honorable David F. Crow is a circuit court judge in the Fifteenth 
Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County.174 In June 2005, Judge 
Crow heard arguments from counsel on a defense motion in limine to 
exclude the undiscounted, billed amounts of plaintiff’s past medical 
care.175 The case involved a plaintiff who benefitted from discounts 
between his HMO and his health care provider.176 Judge Crow justified his 
denial of the defense’s motion, using similar reasoning as this Note, based 
largely on his plain reading of the statute and his interpretation of Goble I, 
Thyssenkrupp, and Goble II. 
In response to the defense’s assertion that the discounts represented 
“phantom damages,”177 Judge Crow stated,  
Counsel, I agree with what you are saying, but how do I get 
around the Supreme Court? If I’m going to do this [apply a set 
off] post trial as a collateral source, then the total bill has to 
come in otherwise the Supreme Court decision makes no 
sense at all, does it?178  
After defense counsel inferred that the legislature may alter the statute 
in some way,179 Judge Crow replied, “I understand. We got one [statute] 
now, so obviously the legislature intends those matters [collateral sources] 
to be reduced post trial. I mean, there’s no other purpose of that statute.”180 
Defense counsel then asserted that contractual discount collateral sources 
should be distinguished from other collateral sources under the statute.181 
To wit, a seemingly frustrated Judge Crow summarized as follows: 
Whatever, okay. By definition it seems to me the legislature 
has decided certain benefits, okay? They are not going to 
allow double recovery for that [discounts], so therefore the 
Court is to reduce the verdict post trial by those amounts that 
are to be paid by those collateral sources. If in fact, I’m going 
to do that before trial, then that statute is completely 
worthless. I mean, why do you got a statute that reduces it 
post trial if you’re going to do it pretrial? . . . Then I have got 
                                                                                                                     
 174. Judge David F. Crow, 15th Judicial Circuit of Florida, http://15thcircuit.co.palm-
beach.fl.us/web/guest/judges/crow (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 175. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 92. 
 176. Id. at 2. 
 177. Id. at 7.  
 178. Id. at 6. 
 179. Id. at 10 (“That’s a good question. After this case, we’ll see what the legislation [sic] does 
with the statute.”). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (“There’s also other collateral sources that come into play, Your Honor. I mean, you 
know, the disability insurance or other factors that wouldn’t necessarily be reduced.”).  
21
Steinberg: Discounted Medical Bills and Conflicting Applications of Florida
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
1452 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
a statute there that means nothing. It’s worthless.182 
 This reasoning by Judge Crow comports with the plain reading of the 
statute advanced in this Note.183 In denying defense’s motion, Judge Crow 
applied the evidentiary standard from the Second District Court of Appeal 
in Goble I and allowed the undiscounted, billed costs into evidence.184 His 
ruling was possibly made with personal reluctance based on a closing 
remark to defense counsel,  
I could argue with you all day about it. I wouldn’t necessarily 
disagree with you, but that’s the way it should be; but I’m not 
the legislature and I’m not the Supreme Court; and I think 
[Goble II] makes it very clear that these things, if they are 
collateral sources under the statute, that I am to make that 
deduction post trial in accordance with [Goble II] and Judge 
Lewis’ concurring opinion.185 
Nothing in the holdings of Goble I, Thyssenkrupp, or Goble II has 
changed since that hearing in 2005. However, at least one survey 
respondent believes that Judge Crow is now a “Thyssenkrupp Man.”186 
When presented with a motion in limine surrounded by similar facts as 
those in the above hearing,187 Judge Crow now disallows the undiscounted, 
billed costs from being admitted into evidence.188 The Honorable Judge 
Crow is just an example of the many judges who are issuing these types of 
contrasting opinions on this issue. Another judge in the Fifteenth Circuit, 
the Honorable Kenneth Stern, was presented with this issue in Wiener v. 
Miller .189 On April 10, 2007, Judge Stern granted a defense motion in 
limine to preclude the undiscounted, billed amounts from being entered 
into evidence.190 Upon hearing a motion for reconsideration filed by the 
plaintiff, however, the court reversed the prior ruling.191  
                                                                                                                     
 182. Id. at 10–11 (emphasis added). 
 183. See supra Part III. 
 184. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 92, at 12. 
 185. Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added).  
 186. Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Jan. 19, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
 187. Specifically, discounts between an HMO and a health care provider. 
 188. Eg. Order Regarding Medical Bill Amounts Admissible at Trial, Boone v. Morgan 
Stanley Real Estate Advisor, Inc., No. 50-2009CAU18048XXXXMB AG (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Feb. 
25, 2010). 
 189. Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Defendants Motion in Limine 
Regarding Medical Bills, Wiener v. Miller, No. 502006CA005313XXXXMB (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 
June 28, 2007). 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. (“The Court has reviewed its prior ruling 4/10/07 Granting Defendant’s Motion in 
Limine regarding medical bills. It is the ruling of this Court that the Plaintiff shall be permitted to 
introduce at trial his total medical bills subject to a post-verdict set-off for contractual insurance 
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Lest it be thought that this inconsistency is limited to the Fifteenth 
Judicial Circuit of Florida, orders granting similar defense motions in 
limine have also been found in the Eighth Judicial Circuit,192 the Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit,193 and the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.194 In October 2005, 
the Honorable Judge Brandt Downey III from the Sixth Circuit applied the 
standard from Goble but took the opportunity to articulate his frustration in 
stating, “We know what the cases are. We know the cases are not giving us 
as bright lined [of] a direct guidance as we would like, and that’s 
unfortunate, but that’s what we have to live with sometimes.”195 
Judges and attorneys alike should not be forced to simply live with it 
and spend the court’s time arguing an issue that could easily be resolved by 
the Florida Supreme Court or the Florida Legislature. 
VI.   SOLUTION IN THE LEGISLATURE OR THE COURT? 
Both the Florida Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court are capable 
of resolving the confusion. The Legislature could amend § 768.76 if it felt 
the statute was not being applied in accordance with the legislative 
intent.196 If the court were presented with a case on point, it could issue a 
clear holding on the same matter. For the reasons set forth above and 
below, clarification from the Florida Supreme Court would be the more 
appropriate measure. 
A.  Amending Florida Statutes § 768.76: An Unnecessary Solution 
At least one commentator who follows this issue proposes that 
clarification would be best accomplished by legislative action.197 This 
commentator proposes three possible alternatives for amendment of the 
“defective” statute.198 The three alternatives are as follows: (1) that 
Medicare and HMO discounts are to be treated differently as evidence; 199 
                                                                                                                     
adjustment amounts that were accepted by Plaintiff’s medical providers.”). 
 192. Order Granting Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Limit Medical Expenses Introduced into 
Evidence at 1, Stone v. Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 01-05-CA-4098 K (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 
2009). 
 193. Omnibus Order on Motions in Limine at 5, Slavin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 06-954 
CA 11 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 2009). 
 194. Order on Defendant’s Motions in Limine at 1, Young v. Gray, No. 03-CA 8295 A (Fla. 
13th Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005). 
 195. Transcript of Hearing at 74, Saia v. Arrango, No. 02-8175-CI-15 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Oct. 
11, 2005).  
 196. The statute has, in fact, been amended three times—in 1993, 1997, and 1999.  
 197. Lawrence Scott Kibler, Regarding Compensation for Past Medical Expenses,  FLA. BAR 
HEALTH LAW SEC. NEWSLETTER (The Fla. Bar Health Law Section), Oct. 2007, at 4. 
 198. Id. at 17–18. 
 199. Id. at 18. The commentator eschews this solution for fear of equal protection challenges. 
As previously addressed, such equal protection challenges have been unsuccessful on very similar 
matters. American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahy, 681 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. 1996), is cited by the 
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(2) that both should be admissible and subject to set off; and (3) that both 
should be inadmissible and juries should see only the discounted 
amounts.200 Each solution suffers from the same misplaced notion that a 
lack of clarity of the current statute frustrates its purpose. 
While this Note posits that the statute is clear and unambiguous, the 
above-mentioned commentator believes that “[t]he current version of the 
set off statute is ambiguous and, at best, defective.” 201 He asserts that the 
evidentiary holding of Goble is contrary to the legislative intent of the 
statute.202 In support of this assertion, he claims that the statute was 
intended to provide set off of “traditional collateral sources” and that the 
drafters did not contemplate “contractual discounts.”203 However, 
discounts were commonplace at the time the statute was enacted. 204 Even 
assuming, arguendo, that the Legislature did not contemplate these 
discounts during drafting, discounts have been a growing practice for the 
twenty-plus years since. 205 The legislature could have amended the statute 
if legislators felt it was not being applied in harmony with the intent.206 I  
has chosen not to with respect to this issue. 
Furthermore, the legislature defined “collateral sources” based on the 
contribution source when it distinguished between public sources such as 
Medicare and private sources such as HMOs. 207 It could have provided 
further definition by distinguishing contribution types such as negotiated 
discounts, contractual discounts, non-discounted bills, co-payment 
amounts, or “write offs.” However, these are just a few of the many types 
of contributions offered by collateral sources.208 To provide clarity, any 
amended legislation would first need to identify every contribution type 
from every contribution source. It would then need to classify whether each 
type is a collateral source subject to set off.  Not only would such 
exhaustive revision be cumbersome for legislators, it would create a 
                                                                                                                     
commentator as evidence that a statute similar to Florida’s was ruled unconstitutional as “violative 
of the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees” of Alabama’s constitution. Kibler, supra note 
197, at 17, 19 n.65. However, as mentioned previously, the Alabama Supreme Court overruled 
Leahy in Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000). See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying 
text. 
 200. Kibler, supra note 197, at 18. 
 201. Id. at 17. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 18. 
 204. See Sorensen, supra note 22, at 469.  
 205. Id. 
 206. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 207. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2) (2010). 
 208. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &  MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH &  HUMAN SERVS., YOUR 
MEDICARE BENEFITS, available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10116.pdf 
(listing benefits available under the program); see also BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF FLA., 
BLUEPRINT FOR HEALTH, available at http://www.bcbsfl.com/DocumentLibrary/ProductsServices/ 
BlueprintforHealthBrochure_65758B.pdf (detailing a common insurance plan for Florida residents). 
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logistical nightmare for jurists who are charged with applying these set 
offs. 
In essence, those who agree with this solution would ask the legislature 
not to clarify the statute but to change it entirely. Whereas courts are now 
forced to litigate over this one type of contribution (discounts), even the 
most exhaustive revision would likely engender even more litigation 
relating to contribution types not identified in any amendment. Such a 
solution seems drastic when there is a more reasonable method available in 
the Florida Supreme Court. 
B.  Clarification by the Florida Supreme Court: The Proper 
Solution 
The Florida Supreme Court could provide clarification by specifying an 
evidentiary standard based on the current statute. The court has analyzed 
§ 768.76 on at least two occasions and has not struggled with interpreting 
and applying the statutory language.209 The court in Goble II articulated 
that its “guiding purpose in construing this statute is to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent.”210 It then stated that in discerning intent, it “first 
look[s] to the language used in the statute.”211 It concluded its analysis by 
stating that if terms are not provided a definition, their “plain and ordinary 
meaning generally can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.”212  
In concluding that these discounts are collateral sources under the 
statutory definition,213 the Goble II court needed little more than a 
Webster’s Dictionary to interpret the statute’s terms.214 Similarly, the 
Caruso court confidently interpreted and applied the procedure for set off 
under § 768.76.215 It clearly stated that “under section 768.76(1), the court 
reduces the jury award by the amount of collateral source benefits.”216 
These two parts of the statute are at the center of the present conflict. 
Given the court’s past interpretation and application of these two parts of 
§ 768.76 individually, doing the same in para materia seems the most 
efficient solution. 
Clarification by the court would also prevent the exhaustiveness 
problem that statutory revision would present.217 It would also be less 
drastic than statutory revision and likely less lecherous of the state’s 
resources to accomplish the goal.  Such a clarification by the Florida 
                                                                                                                     
 209. See, e.g., Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2005); Caruso v. Baumle, 880 So. 
2d 540, 543–44 (Fla. 2004). 
 210. Goble, 901 So. 2d at 832 (citing State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002)). 
 211. Id. (citing Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000)). 
 212. Id. at 833 (citing Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id.  
 215. Caruso v. Baumle, 880 So. 2d 540, 543–44 (Fla. 2004). 
 216. Id. at 544. 
 217. See supra Part VI.A. 
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Supreme Court would settle the issue and be binding on all courts who are 
now spending time and resources on motions and hearings arguing both 
sides. 
VII.   LET’S BE “REASONABLE”:  THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND 
FUTURE DAMAGES 
Florida is a “reasonable value” jurisdiction where plaintiffs are entitled 
to recover the reasonable costs of care.218 This is true even with § 768.76 
limiting the ultimate recovery of past damages to the actual amount paid on 
the plaintiff’s behalf.219 Florida may be in the minority of “reasonable 
value” jurisdictions that, by statute, limit recovery to the actual amount 
paid,220 but this Note takes no issue with set offs under § 768.76 being 
applied to past damages. However, because of Florida’s rules of evidence 
and longstanding law against setting off future damages,221 applying the 
Thyssenkrupp standard to statutory collateral sources would threaten 
Florida’s “reasonable value” status. 
A.  Florida’s Evidence Code and “Reasonableness” 
The Florida Evidence Code mandates the relevant evidence that 
Marcie’s lawyer may introduce to establish the reasonably anticipated costs 
of future care.222 This can include, among other mechanisms, expert 
witnesses.223 For Marcie, the best expert to establish these reasonable costs 
would be the same doctor who provided her prior treatment. Marcie may 
still be able to call upon her doctor to testify as to reasonableness in a court 
applying Thyssenkrupp. However, her attorney fears that any testimony 
regarding the undiscounted, retail costs of future care from Marcie’s doctor 
would be contradictory to the discounted bills improperly allowed into 
evidence. The result of which would be either jury confusion, a de facto 
showing of insurance coverage, or a jury assumption that the doctor is 
disingenuous about the true costs of future care. 
It is the opinion of many practitioners surveyed that such a restriction 
“handicap[s]”224 Marcie from the very start by preventing her from 
establishing reasonableness through the expert most knowledgeable of her 
condition. Even though Marcie may produce other relevant evidence to 
                                                                                                                     
 218. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 669–70 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (discussing 
recovery jurisdictions and putting Florida in the “minority” (citing Coop. Leasing v. Johnson, 872 
So. 2d 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004))).  
 221. See infra Part VII.A–B. 
 222. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.401–.402 (2010). 
 223. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.702–.705 (2010). 
 224. See, e.g., Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file 
with author). 
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establish the reasonableness of her for future damages,225 the figurative 
“bell has rung” once the Thyssenkrupp standard is misapplied in cases 
involving statutorily defined collateral sources. Not only will the jury be 
limited to considering the discounted bills, the jurors are likely to be 
skeptical of Marcie’s demand when her own doctor is unable to support the 
amount being requested for reasonable future damages. 
Under Florida law, a defense attorney is precluded from making any 
mention of the fact that a plaintiff will receive the benefit of insurance 
when a jury is deciding future damages.226 Likewise, a plaintiff’s attorney 
is precluded from making any mention of the fact that a plaintiff will not 
receive the benefit of insurance when a jury is deciding future damages. 
Some of the attorneys surveyed classified the allowance of only discounted 
bills as an “end run around” the rules, with defense attorneys making de 
facto showings of insurance coverage.227 They reason that juries 
contrasting discounted bills with large requests for future damages will 
infer that the plaintiff has or had insurance coverage.228 This de facto 
showing may make a jury less inclined to award sufficient damages to an 
already compensated plaintiff. Such a result would be in contravention to 
the rules of evidence and exactly what the collateral source doctrine was 
conceived to prevent.229 
B.  Reductions in Future Damage Awards Are Not Reasonable 
If courts applying Thyssenkrupp to statutory collateral sources are 
effectively endorsing pre-award reductions in future damages, this would 
be contrary to well established law of the state. In Florida, the courts have 
established that future damage awards are not to be reduced due to past 
collateral source contributions.230 In Measom v. Rainbow Connection 
Preschool, Inc., the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the reduction of 
future damages by the trial court.231 It held that §768.76 did not allow for 
set offs of future medical expenses.232 The court reasoned that in dealing 
                                                                                                                     
 225. Id. 
 226. See Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163, 165 (Fla.1970) (holding 
existence or amount of insurance has no bearing on the issue of liability and damages and such 
reference was reversible error); Gold, Vann & White, P.A. v. DeBerry, 639 So. 2d 47, 54 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1994) (“It is hornbook law that a jury should not learn of the existence of insurance coverage 
or insurance limits.” (citing Melrose Nursery, Inc. v. Hunt, 443 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); 
Craft v. Kramer, 571 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990))).  
 227. See, e.g., Interview with Spencer Kuvin, Partner, Leopold & Kuvin (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file 
with author). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See supra Part II. 
 230. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text.  
 231. Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc., 568 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1990). 
 232. Id.  
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with past damages, it is already known what contributions were made on 
the plaintiff’s behalf.233 Conversely, availability of these contributions in 
the future is unknown.234 The Measom court’s reasoning is exemplified by 
a plaintiff, such as Marcie, who benefited from contributions in the past 
that are no longer available in the future.  
Similarly, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Allstate Insurance Co. 
v. Rudnick held that § 768.76 did not allow for reductions in future 
damages.235 It cited its prior decision in White v. Westlund236 to support the 
conclusion that “benefits ‘otherwise available’ under section 768.76(1), did 
not include benefits potentially payable in the future.”237 Its holding 
remained in line with Westlund that “in order to have collateral source 
benefits set off against an award, those benefits must either be already 
paid . . . or presently earned and currently due and owing. . . .”238 Based on 
this reasoning and precedent, the court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to 
reduce the plaintiff’s future damage awards.239 
Based on the statements of the courts, the rules of evidence, and the 
refusal to allow for reductions in future damage awards, Florida is 
undoubtedly a “reasonable value” jurisdiction. If Marcie’s court applies 
Thyssenkrupp and restricts her ability to establish the reasonable value of 
future care, it may allow opposing counsel to circumvent the rules of 
evidence and endorse a de facto reduction in her future damage award. In 
that circumstance, Florida’s status as a “reasonable value” jurisdiction 
would be questionable, at best.  
VIII.   THE SOLOMON SOLUTION: THE SUPREME COURTS OF OHIO 
AND KANSAS 
While Solomon himself did not actually “split the baby” for the sake of 
compromise,240 the term “splitting the baby” has become a popular idiom 
used in law to reflect compromise.241 Reflecting this modern parlance, the 
“babies” at issue here are the medical bills that plaintiffs and attorneys 
alike wish to provide to the jury, exclusively.242 In that sense, the supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. (“The statute does not purport to benefit the tortfeasor by deducting collateral sources 
to which the insured may be entitled in the future.”). 
 235. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 706 So. 2d 389, 390–91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“[I]n order to 
have collateral source benefits set off against an award, those benefits must either be already 
paid . . . or presently earned and currently due and owing . . . .” (quoting White v. Westlund, 624 
So. 2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993))(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 236. 624 So. 2d at 1153. 
 237. Rudnick, 706 So. 2d at 390 (citing Westlund, 624 So. 2d at 1148) (emphasis added). 
 238. Id. at 390–91 (quoting Westlund, 624 So. 2d at 1153) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 239. Id. at 391. 
 240. 1 Kings 3:16–28. 
 241. See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 824 (2d ed. 1995). 
 242. See supra Part V.A. 
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courts of Ohio and Kansas recently split the baby when each decided upon 
the evidentiary issue presented by discounted medical bills.243 Sitting in 
“reasonable value” jurisdictions,244 those courts similarly held that both the 
undiscounted medical bills and the discounted medical bills may be 
admitted to the jury as being relevant to the “reasonable value” of care.245 
On May 4, 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Jaques v. Manton.246 Richard Jaques brought a personal-injury action 
against Patricia Manton to recover for injuries he sustained in a car 
accident.247 Jaques’s several medical providers billed his insurance 
company a total of $21,874.80.248 These same providers accepted a 
discounted amount of $7,483.91 as payment in full. 249 After a jury verdict 
in favor of Jaques, Manton appealed claiming that the trial court erred by 
not allowing her to present evidence of the discounted amount to the jury. 
250 After losing on appeal, Manton took her case to the Ohio Supreme 
Court.251 In reversing the lower appellate court, the Ohio Supreme Court 
opined that, “The reasonable value may not be either the amount billed by 
medical providers or the amount accepted as full payment.”252 Therefore, 
the court held that the original medical bills and the discounted medical 
bills are admissible as evidence of the reasonable cost of care.253 
One month later, on June 4, 2010, the Kansas Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Martinez v. Milburn Enterprises, Inc.254 Karen 
Martinez filed suit against Milburn Enterprises after she slipped and fell 
while shopping.255 After back surgery, Martinez’s provider billed her 
insurance company a total of $70,496.15.256 The provider accepted a 
discounted amount of $5,310 as payment in full.257 Antithetically to the 
trial court’s holding in Jaques,258 here, the trial court granted a defendant’s 
                                                                                                                     
 243. Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 208 (Kan. 2010); Jaques v. Manton, 928 
N.E.2d 434, 439 (Ohio 2010). 
 244. Martinez, 233 P.3d at 208; Jaques, 928 N.E.2d at 438. 
 245. Martinez, 233 P.3d at 208; Jaques, 928 N.E.2d at 439. 
 246. Jaques, 928 N.E.2d at 434. 
 247. Id. at 436.  
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 438 (citing Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (Ohio 2006)). 
 253. Id. at 439. 
 254. Martinez v. Milburn Enterprises, Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 205 (Kan. 2010). 
 255. Id. at 208. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. (noting that due to contractual discounts with the insurer, the hospital wrote off the 
balance of $65,186.15). 
 258. Jaques, 928 N.E.2d at 436–37 (holding that the defendant could not admit evidence of the 
discounted bills).  
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motion to limit the evidence to the discounted amount.259 Martinez filed an 
interlocutory appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals, which the Kansas 
Supreme Court transferred to its own docket.260 The court framed the issue 
as whether the collateral source rule bars evidence of the undiscounted 
billed amount or the discounted amount.261 In reversing the decision of the 
trial court, the Kansas Supreme Court employed similar reasoning to that 
in Jaques and held that, “[T]he rule does not bar either type of evidence; 
both are relevant to prove the reasonable value of the medical treatment, 
which is a question for the finder of fact.”262 
The jurisdictional differences between Florida, Ohio, and Kansas make 
this solution unsuitable for Florida. This is not to say that there are no 
similarities between the three states in regard to the statutory and common 
law on this topic. Florida, Ohio, and Kansas are all reasonable value 
jurisdictions.263 All three states employ their own versions of the collateral 
source rule.264 However, the collateral source rule is founded in statute in 
Florida and Ohio265 while the Kansas rule is in the common law.266 
Furthermore, neither Ohio nor Kansas have a post-verdict judicial set off 
mandate as Florida does in § 768.76.267 These differences outweigh the 
similarities and make splitting the baby an inappropriate solution for 
Florida’s current conflict.  
First, Florida Statutes § 768.76 clearly designates the judge, not the 
jury, as the ultimate arbiter of the value of collateral source 
contributions.268 Second, this solution may still result in de facto 
reductions in future damages based on evidence of discounted medical 
bills, inapposite to the aforementioned history of Florida law protecting the 
integrity of those awards.269 Third, this solution would fly in the face of 
Florida’s bar on the jury’s knowledge of insurance.270 Finally, this solution 
                                                                                                                     
 259. Martinez, 233 P.3d at 208. 
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 263. See supra notes 68–69, 244 and accompanying text. 
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 269. See supra Part VII.B. 
 270. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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may still serve to prejudice a plaintiff such as Marcie who will not enjoy 
the benefit of those discounts in the costs of her future care. For all of these 
reasons, Florida ought to resist the parlance of the times and follow the true 
wisdom of Solomon by not splitting this baby.  
IX.   CONCLUSION 
The holdings of the Second District Court of Appeal in Goble I and the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Thyssenkrupp are both correctly decided 
under Florida Statutes § 768.76. They are distinguishable in that Goble 
addressed a statutorily defined collateral source (HMO benefits) while 
Thyssenkrupp addressed a statutorily defined non-collateral source 
(Medicare). This often-overlooked distinction is resulting in many 
plaintiffs being foreclosed from establishing the reasonable costs of future 
care without the prejudice of discounts that may no longer be available to 
them in the future. The impact of this issue is two-fold. First, a confusion 
in the trial courts stemming from an apparent lack ofclear direction.271 
Second, a concern among the attorneys stemming from the application of 
differing evidentiary standards among courts within the same 
jurisdiction.272  
To resolve the confusion, it is necessary that the Florida Supreme Court 
accept jurisdiction on a case that asks the question: Does Florida Statutes 
§ 768.76 bar evidence of statutorily-defined collateral source contributions, 
including discounts, to establish the reasonable costs of care and a 
tortfeasor’s liability? If the answer is yes, Thyssenkrupp must be limited to 
cases of Medicare and other statutory non-collateral source contributions 
and Goble limited to statutory collateral source contributions. If the answer 
is no, then the set off portion of the statute is rendered meaningless as the 
judge’s job will have been done by the jury during trial. The Florida 
Supreme Court has stated that “‘a basic rule of statutory construction 
provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, 
and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute 
meaningless.’”273 Based on a plain reading of the statute, the relevant 
holdings of the applicable cases and the desire to hold fast to this basic 
rule, the only reasonable answer is “yes.” This will stay true to the 
legislative intent, allow the court to prevent a windfall through post-trial 
set off, and prevent bias against a plaintiff for nothing more than having 
responsibly carried insurance in the past.  
Perhaps Marcie will recover someday. However, if she is fortunate 
enough to be made whole physically and mentally but not made whole 
financially as a result of an award based on discounts she no longer 
receives, it would be bittersweet, indeed.  
                                                                                                                     
 271. See supra Part V.B. 
 272. See supra Part V.A. 
 273. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 366 (Fla. 2005) 
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